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dc.contributor.authorItaya, Jun-ichien_US
dc.contributor.authorOkamura, Makotoen_US
dc.contributor.authorYamaguchi, Chikaraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:08Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46440-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3240en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.jelF59en_US
dc.subject.jelF21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax coordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric countriesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwFaktorproportionentheoremen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePartial harmonization of corporate taxes in an asymmetric repeated game settingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640577288en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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