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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.contributor.authorBrett, Craigen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeymark, John A.en_US
dc.description.abstractTax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive taxes to one country and whose utility is larger than the average utility in the other country or in which the lowest skilled are subsidized. We also show that it is possible for the most highly skilled to receive a net transfer funded by taxes on lower skilled individuals in equilibrium. These findings confirm the race-to-the-bottom thesis in this setting.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3329en_US
dc.subject.keywordincome tax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor mobilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal income taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordrace to the bottomen_US
dc.subject.stwHochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Arbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.titleStrategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobilityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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