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dc.contributor.authorChirinko, Robert S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchaller, Huntleyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46433-
dc.description.abstractMany economists believe that the stock market plays an important role in efficiently allocating capital to its most productive uses. This standard story of the stock market was called into question by events in the late 1990s, when some observers believed that stock market overvaluation - or a bubble - led to overinvestment. Both the standard and overinvestment stories involve discount rates and, to differentiate between the two stories, this paper examines the discount rates used by firms in making their investment decisions. We use a revealed preference approach that relies on the pattern of investment spending - combined with investment theory - to estimate the discount rates used by managers. The standard story predicts that firms with high stock prices and good investment opportunities should have discount rates that do not differ systematically from the risk-adjusted market rate. The overinvestment story predicts that firms with high stock prices and poor investment opportunities should have discount rates consistently below the market rate. Based on a panel dataset of over 50,000 firm-year observations, we find support for both stories. The behavior of high stock price firms with good measured investment opportunities is best described by the standard story, while the overinvestment story provides the most appropriate interpretation of the behavior of high stock price firms with poor investment opportunities. Firms in this latter category accumulate between 15.1% and 45.2% too much capital. These estimates suggest that, even before they burst, bubbles adversely affect economic activity by misallocating capital.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth 3491en_US
dc.subject.jelE44en_US
dc.subject.jelE22en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelE32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbubblesen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordstock marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordreal effects of financial marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital formationen_US
dc.titleDo bubbles lead to overinvestment? A revealed preference approachen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn662658000en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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