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dc.contributor.authorWatkins, Williamen_US
dc.contributor.authorBohn, Henningen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:18:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:18:28Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3462en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment spendingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartisan politicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordprecommitmenten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Ausgabenen_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwParteipolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsquoteen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePrecommitted government spending and partisan politicsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661655644en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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