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Title:Precommitted government spending and partisan politics PDF Logo
Authors:Watkins, William
Bohn, Henning
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3462
Abstract:This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.
Subjects:government spending
partisan politics
political economy
precommitment
JEL:D72
H40
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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