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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404
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| Title: | | Precommitted government spending and partisan politics  |
| Authors: | | Watkins, William Bohn, Henning |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3462 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes. |
| Subjects: | | government spending partisan politics political economy precommitment |
| JEL: | | D72 H40 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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