Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46392
Authors: 
Kemnitz, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Economics of Education 3193
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how the abolishment of a ban on tuition fees affects the quality of higher education with centralized and decentralized decision making. It is shown that a marginal introduction of tuition fees fully crowds out public funds under centralization, whereas educational quality improves under decentralization. However, if the government has full discretion about the tuition fee level, centralization leads to the efficient quality, fully extracting the income gains from the graduates, while decentralization typically induces inefficiently low spending levels.
Subjects: 
higher education
federalism
tuition fees
JEL: 
H77
I22
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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