|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46389
|
| | |
| Title: | | Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?  |
| Authors: | | Hefeker, Carsten Zimmer, Blandine |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3344 |
| Abstract: | | The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so as to minimise society's loss function. We find that the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is not necessarily characterised by substitutability. When uncertainty about the central bank's preferences is high, independence and conservatism can become complements. In this case, giving more independence to the central bank increases the need for conservatism. |
| Subjects: | | central bank independence conservatism transparency |
| JEL: | | E52 E58 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46389
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|