Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46389
Authors: 
Hefeker, Carsten
Zimmer, Blandine
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3344
Abstract: 
The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so as to minimise society's loss function. We find that the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is not necessarily characterised by substitutability. When uncertainty about the central bank's preferences is high, independence and conservatism can become complements. In this case, giving more independence to the central bank increases the need for conservatism.
Subjects: 
central bank independence
conservatism
transparency
JEL: 
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
314.46 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.