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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Markusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:58Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46384-
dc.description.abstractPoliticians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3327en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddemocracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordthreshold contracts and triple mechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInformation markets, elections and contractsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659353199en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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