Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46384 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Markusen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-19-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:58Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46384-
dc.description.abstractPoliticians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3327en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddemocracyen
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen
dc.subject.keywordinformation marketsen
dc.subject.keywordthreshold contracts and triple mechanismen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwVertragen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInformation markets, elections and contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659353199en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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