Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46369
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dc.contributor.authorKunze, Larsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:41Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46369-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyses how independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy councils) can strengthen the incentives for fiscal discipline. By increasing fiscal transparency they can raise the awareness of the long-run costs of current deficits and increase the reputational costs for governments of violating their fiscal rules. Councils that make also normative judgements, where fiscal policy is evaluated against the government's own pre-set objectives, are likely to be more influential than councils that do only positive analysis. To fulfil their role adequately, fiscal watchdogs should be granted independence in much the same way as central banks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth |x3367en_US
dc.subject.jelH60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal institutionsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeficit biasen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal transparencyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Beratungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzkontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwAutonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropaen_US
dc.titleThe role of independent fiscal policy institutionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659491257en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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