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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46366-
dc.description.abstractI develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient, short-term contracts can be worse due to hold-up problems. The optimal long-term contract is more ambitious if its length is relatively short and the technological spillover large. The optimal length increases in this externality. With renegotiation, the outcome is first best. The results have several implications for how to design a climate treaty.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Empirical and Theoretical Methods 2962en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelF55en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic private provision of public goodsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic common pool problemsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic hold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract-lengthen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiation designen_US
dc.subject.keywordclimate change and climate agreementsen_US
dc.titleThe dynamics of climate agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644949252en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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