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dc.contributor.authorLefèbvre, Mathieuen_US
dc.contributor.authorPestieau, Pierreen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiedl, Arnoen_US
dc.contributor.authorVilleval, Marie-Claireen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:19Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46349-
dc.description.abstractIn a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a 'registered' income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an 'unregistered' income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.rformance and provide reliable estimates of the policy model coefficients associated with small central bank losses, in particular during periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3408en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelH31en_US
dc.subject.jelI38en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial frauden_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial comparisonsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcross-country comparisonsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerfluchten_US
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialhilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwBetrugen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwVergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwBelgienen_US
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen_US
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen_US
dc.titleTax evasion, welfare fraud, and 'the broken windows' effect: An experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlandsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn660141418en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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