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dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorRommeswinkel, Hendriken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups. For groups with heterogenous valuations the complementarity of group members' efforts is shown to play a role as a further factor.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3362en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup-size paradoxen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenvertretungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTechnological determinants of the group-size paradoxen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659489015en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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