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dc.contributor.authorStahl, Konrad O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Rolanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:15:37Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:15:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46330-
dc.description.abstractWho does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3365en_US
dc.subject.jelD40en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcertificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinspectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlemonsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmiddlemenen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.stwNormungen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwKundenen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwKraftfahrzeugindustrieen_US
dc.titleWho should pay for certification?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659490609en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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