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dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Nadineen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchildberg-Hörisch, Hannahen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:15:07Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:15:07Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46303-
dc.description.abstractWe use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3450en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelK40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-binding obligationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexpressive lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleAsymmetric obligationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661604691en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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