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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46303
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| Title: | | Asymmetric obligations  |
| Authors: | | Riedel, Nadine Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3450 |
| Abstract: | | We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation. |
| Subjects: | | non-binding obligations expressive law public goods experiment |
| JEL: | | C92 H41 K40 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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