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Title:Asymmetric obligations PDF Logo
Authors:Riedel, Nadine
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3450
Abstract:We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.
Subjects:non-binding obligations
expressive law
public goods
experiment
JEL:C92
H41
K40
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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