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Title:Voting under the threat of secession: Accommodation vs. repression PDF Logo
Authors:Anesi, Vincent
De Donder, Philippe
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3458
Abstract:We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government's type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic factors, the relative size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences.
Subjects:majority voting
secession risk
cultural distinctiveness
conflict
overlapping regional preferences
JEL:D72
D74
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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