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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46289
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| Title: | | Voting under the threat of secession: Accommodation vs. repression  |
| Authors: | | Anesi, Vincent De Donder, Philippe |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3458 |
| Abstract: | | We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium with a government's type biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic factors, the relative size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences. |
| Subjects: | | majority voting secession risk cultural distinctiveness conflict overlapping regional preferences |
| JEL: | | D72 D74 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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