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dc.contributor.authorVives, Xavieren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:14:37Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:14:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46277-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3485en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD84en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddouble auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrate of convergenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioural tradersen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplementaritiesen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwRationale Erwartungen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA large-market rational expectations equilibrium modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661907937en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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