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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46277
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| Title: | | A large-market rational expectations equilibrium model  |
| Authors: | | Vives, Xavier |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3485 |
| Abstract: | | This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing. |
| Subjects: | | adverse selection information acquisition double auction multi-unit auctions rate of convergence behavioural traders complementarities |
| JEL: | | D82 D84 G14 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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