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dc.contributor.authorGoertz, Johanna M. M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorManiquet, Françoisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:14:25Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:14:25Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46267-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior tovoting. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with two alternatives (e.g., Myerson (1998)). We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium under the simple plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alternatives and the condition under which they exist. There is only one type of inefficient equilibrium with two alternatives. In this equilibrium, voters vote unresponsively because they all vote for the same alternative. Under the same condition, the same type of equilibrium exists with three alternatives. However, we show that the number and types of coordination failures increase with three alternatives, and that this leads to the existence of other types of inefficient equilibria as well, including those in which voters vote informatively.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3457en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordefficient information aggregationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsimple plurality ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordPoisson gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordCondorcet Jury Theoremen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationen_US
dc.subject.stwAggregationen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn a three-alternative Condorcet jury theoremen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661651096en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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