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dc.contributor.authorHielscher, Kaien_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:14:24Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:14:24Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46266-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically studies the impact of the quality of political institutions on the link between central bank independence and inflation. Making use of data on the evolution of central bank independence over time and controlling for possible nonlinearities, we employ interaction models to identify the conditions under which more central bank independence will enhance a country's inflation performance. Examining a cross-section of up to 69 countries, we are able to show that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence must be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of the political institutions must be sufficiently high.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3396en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE02en_US
dc.subject.jelE31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordinflationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutional qualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleThe role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn660155508en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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