Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46254 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3373
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.
Schlagwörter: 
university competition
research
tuition fees
JEL: 
H52
I22
I23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
283.46 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.