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Title:Competition between state universities PDF Logo
Authors:Luporini, Lisa
Grazzini, Annalisa
Petretto, Alessandro
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Economics of Education 3373
Abstract:We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.
Subjects:university competition
research
tuition fees
JEL:H52
I22
I23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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