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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46254
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| Title: | | Competition between state universities  |
| Authors: | | Luporini, Lisa Grazzini, Annalisa Petretto, Alessandro |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Economics of Education 3373 |
| Abstract: | | We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees. |
| Subjects: | | university competition research tuition fees |
| JEL: | | H52 I22 I23 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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