Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46254
Authors: 
Luporini, Lisa
Grazzini, Annalisa
Petretto, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Economics of Education 3373
Abstract: 
We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.
Subjects: 
university competition
research
tuition fees
JEL: 
H52
I22
I23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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