Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46238
Authors: 
Meier, Volker
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3295
Abstract: 
We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.
Subjects: 
Lindahl pricing
noncooperative games
private provision of public goods
Stackelberg equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D61
H21
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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