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Title:One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing PDF Logo
Authors:Meier, Volker
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3295
Abstract:We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.
Subjects:Lindahl pricing
noncooperative games
private provision of public goods
Stackelberg equilibrium
JEL:C72
D61
H21
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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