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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46238
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| Title: | | One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing  |
| Authors: | | Meier, Volker |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3295 |
| Abstract: | | We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners. |
| Subjects: | | Lindahl pricing noncooperative games private provision of public goods Stackelberg equilibrium |
| JEL: | | C72 D61 H21 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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