|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46237
|
| | |
| Title: | | Bank bailouts, international linkages and cooperation  |
| Authors: | | Niepmann, Friederike Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3384 |
| Abstract: | | Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crisis and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses and intra- and inter-country income inequality, in the non-cooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, no burden sharing and free-riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare. |
| Subjects: | | bailout contagion financial crisis international institutional arrangements |
| JEL: | | F36 F42 G01 G28 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46237
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|