Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46200 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1024
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We address investment in regulated natural gas pipelines when investment is lumpy and the demand for gas is stochastic. This is a problem that can be solved in theory as a dynamic program, but a practical solution depends on functions and parameters that are either subjective or cannot be estimated. We then reformulate the problem from the standpoint of consumers that face incomplete markets. It is shown that for reasonable parameter values consumers prefer to pay for excess capacity rather than bear the risk of congestion. These strategies can be implemented with reasonably straightforward policies. Since the demand for gas is very inelastic, the welfare losses associated from small deviations from a first best optimum are minimal. This implies that the gas pipeline system can be regulated with a relatively simple set of transparent rules without any significant loss of welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Transmission investment
Natural-gas regulation
Congestion management
Gas pipelines
Second-best theory
JEL: 
L51
L95
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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