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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Addison, John T. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kuhn, Thomas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-05-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-28T13:54:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-06-28T13:54:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5170 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J64 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | matching unemployment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public employment service | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | delegation problem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | search theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsvermittlung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsverwaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsuche | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperative Führung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Betriebliche Budgetierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomischer Anreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 657595411 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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