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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Addison, John T. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kuhn, Thomas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-28T13:54:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-28T13:54:25Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x5170 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | matching unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public employment service | en |
dc.subject.keyword | delegation problem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | search theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsvermittlung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsverwaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsuche | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperative Führung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betriebliche Budgetierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 657595411 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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