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dc.contributor.authorAddison, John T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorAltemeyer-Bartscher, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorKuhn, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-28T13:54:25Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-28T13:54:25Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079-
dc.description.abstractThe poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5170en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmatching unemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic employment serviceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegation problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordsearch theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvermittlungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Budgetierungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment servicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657595411en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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