Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45993
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Kübler, Dorothea
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5264
Abstract: 
This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.
Subjects: 
social norms
incentives
contracts
JEL: 
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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