Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45871 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1674
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Several authors have proposed staggered wage bargaining as a way to introduce sticky wages into search and matching models while preserving individual rationality. I evaluate the quantitative implications of such an approach. I feed through a series of estimated shocks from US data into a search and matching model with sticky prices and wages. I compare the implications of how the sticky wages enter into the hiring decision, and there seems to be a tradeoff between generating business cycle volatility and matching the lack of a long-run relationship between vacancy creation and inflation. With regard to wages, the sticky wage model unconditionally does a better job at matching wages than the flexible wage model.
Schlagwörter: 
Sticky wages
sticky prices
staggered Nash bargaining
inflation
new hires
search and matching
business cycles
JEL: 
E24
E25
E32
J23
J31
J63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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