Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45777 
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dc.contributor.authorvan den Berg, Gerard J.en
dc.contributor.authorVikström, Johanen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-22-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:30:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:30:19Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45777-
dc.description.abstractUnemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact that the data register is large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with monitoring of job offer rejection versus monitoring of job search effort. The observation window includes a discontinuous policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) |cUppsalaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009:18en
dc.subject.jelC21en
dc.subject.jelC41en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.jelJ44en
dc.subject.jelJ62en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.jelJ65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUnemploymenten
dc.subject.keyworddurationen
dc.subject.keywordsanctionen
dc.subject.keywordwageen
dc.subject.keywordhours workeden
dc.subject.keywordweighted exegenous sampling maximum likelihooden
dc.subject.keywordcase workeren
dc.subject.keywordjob offeren
dc.subject.keywordoffer rejectionen
dc.subject.keywordsearch efforten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktpolitiken
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen
dc.subject.stwAnspruchslohnen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhältnisen
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen
dc.titleMonitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608419044en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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