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dc.contributor.authorvan den Berg, Gerard J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorVikström, Johanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:30:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:30:19Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45777-
dc.description.abstractUnemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact that the data register is large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with monitoring of job offer rejection versus monitoring of job search effort. The observation window includes a discontinuous policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. for Labour Market Policy Evaluation Uppsalaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper // IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2009:18en_US
dc.subject.jelC21en_US
dc.subject.jelC41en_US
dc.subject.jelJ31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ44en_US
dc.subject.jelJ62en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelJ65en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keyworddurationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsanctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordwageen_US
dc.subject.keywordhours workeden_US
dc.subject.keywordweighted exegenous sampling maximum likelihooden_US
dc.subject.keywordcase workeren_US
dc.subject.keywordjob offeren_US
dc.subject.keywordoffer rejectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsearch efforten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen_US
dc.subject.stwAnspruchslohnen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsverhältnisen_US
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen_US
dc.titleMonitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job qualityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608419044en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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