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Title:Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality PDF Logo
Authors:van den Berg, Gerard J.
Vikström, Johan
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Working paper // IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2009:18
Abstract:Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact that the data register is large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with monitoring of job offer rejection versus monitoring of job search effort. The observation window includes a discontinuous policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort.
Subjects:Unemployment
duration
sanction
wage
hours worked
weighted exegenous sampling maximum likelihood
case worker
job offer
offer rejection
search effort
JEL:C21
C41
J31
J44
J62
J64
J65
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

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