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dc.contributor.authorArni, Patricken_US
dc.contributor.authorLalive, Rafaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorvan Ours, Jan C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:29:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:29:41Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45753-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions ,i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. for Labour Market Policy Evaluation Uppsalaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper // IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2009:22en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelJ65en_US
dc.subject.jelJ68en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBenefit sanctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordearnings effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemployment durationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompeting-risk duration modelsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stw├ľkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwStatistische Bestandsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleHow effective are unemployment benefit sanctions? Looking beyond unemployment exiten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612747980en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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