EconStor >
IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy, Uppsala >
Working Papers, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45731
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJohansson, Peren_US
dc.contributor.authorLindahl, Ericaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:29:17Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:29:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45731-
dc.description.abstractDuring the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social interactions for explaining sickness absence behavior. In this context public discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for reducing the sickness absence. In this paper we study whether information meetings about the Swedish sickness insurance affect the length of sickness absence spells. The study is based on experimental data on individuals with weak labor market attachments. The displacement of when the call to the meeting was sent out was randomized. Comparing the survival functions of those called immediately with those whose calls were delayed (by about 30 days) makes it possible to study whether the length of sickness absence is affected by receiving the call earlier. The result suggests that the length is reduced by, on average, 20 percent. In the long term (12 months later) there is no effect of the information meeting. This suggests that attendance to the information meeting does not change individuals' long-term behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. for Labour Market Policy Evaluation Uppsalaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper // IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 2010:11en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelH51en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.jelJ22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic social insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordsurvival analysisen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstrumental variablesen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwFehlzeiten_US
dc.subject.stwKrankheiten_US
dc.subject.stwKrankenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen_US
dc.titleCan sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638844622en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
638844622.pdf303.57 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.