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dc.contributor.authorSaravia, Antonioen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-26T10:00:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-26T10:00:52Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD) |cLa Pazen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDevelopment Research Working Paper Series |x07/2008en
dc.subject.jelD720en
dc.subject.jelH110en
dc.subject.jelO570en
dc.subject.jelP160en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEconomic Freedomen
dc.subject.keywordInstitutional Changeen
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Competitionen
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Institutionsen
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wandelen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.titleA note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedom-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn581178807en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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