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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Saravia, Antonio | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-26T10:00:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-05-26T10:00:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD) |cLa Paz | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDevelopment Research Working Paper Series |x07/2008 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D720 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H110 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O570 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P160 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Economic Freedom | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Institutional Change | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Political Competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Political Institutions | en |
dc.subject.stw | Institutioneller Wandel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.title | A note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedom | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 581178807 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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