Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670
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dc.contributor.authorSaravia, Antonioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-26T10:00:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-26T10:00:52Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. for Advanced Development Studies |cLa Pazen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDevelopment Research Working Paper Series |x2008/07en_US
dc.subject.jelD720en_US
dc.subject.jelH110en_US
dc.subject.jelO570en_US
dc.subject.jelP160en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEconomic Freedomen_US
dc.subject.keywordInstitutional Changeen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Institutionsen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wandelen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleA note on the U-shaped relationship between political competition and economic freedomen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn581178807en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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