Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45670
Authors: 
Saravia, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Development Research Working Paper Series 2008/07
Abstract: 
We investigate a recent political theory of institutional change according to which institutions of economic freedom are more likely to be adopted at the extreme cases of strong and weak political competition than at cases in between. We find that such a U-shaped relationship is verified when controlling for other political variables and past economic growth, but disappears when controlling for the initial level of development. In this case, the relationship between political competition and the adoption of institutions of economic freedom appears to be positive and linear as suggested by the political principal-agent paradigm.
Subjects: 
Economic Freedom
Institutional Change
Political Competition
Political Institutions
JEL: 
D720
H110
O570
P160
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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