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Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) >
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) >
Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Puppe, Clemens | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Tasnádi, Attila | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-05-09 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-05-23T09:50:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-05-23T09:50:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:swb:90-229984 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | KIT [u.a.] Karlsruhe | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working paper series in economics 24 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | districting | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | gerrymandering | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Axiomatic districting | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 657459097 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:kitwps:24 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
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