Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634
Authors: 
Puppe, Clemens
Tasnádi, Attila
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper series in economics 24
Abstract: 
In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
Subjects: 
districting
gerrymandering
JEL: 
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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