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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45614
  

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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.contributor.authorWallace, Brianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-19T09:57:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-19T09:57:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-018-5en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45614-
dc.description.abstractCooperation in prisoner's dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 19en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPrisoner's dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordInfinite-horizon gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen_US
dc.titleThe impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659004682en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:19-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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