EconStor >
Bruegel, Brussels >
Bruegel Policy Contribution >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45527
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDewatripont, Mathiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorNguyen, Gregoryen_US
dc.contributor.authorPraet, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorSapir, Andréen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-12T10:12:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-12T10:12:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45527-
dc.description.abstractThe financial crisis exposed Europe's inadequacy in developing an effective banking resolution framework that could bring together national authorities and set guidelines for their coordination. The European Commission, through its assessment of state aid cases, managed to avoid single market distortions and mitigate moral hazard. This Policy Contribution explains why in the long-term Europe needs a single resolution authority. The authors Bruegel Senior Research Fellow André Sapir, Mathias Dewatripont, ULB and CEPR; Gregory Nguyen, National Bank of Belgium, and Peter Praet, National Bank of Belgium, show how in the short-term, the European Commission, through its state aid control discipline, can set the foundation for a new crisis resolution architecture. It can act as a substitute to improve coordination among member states and complement a European resolution authority once it is set up.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBruegel Brusselsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBruegel policy contribution 2010/04en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwBankenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwBankenkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleThe role of state aid control in improving bank resolution in Europeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn629470995en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Bruegel Policy Contribution

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
629470995.pdf102.85 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.