Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45527 
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dc.contributor.authorDewatripont, Mathiasen
dc.contributor.authorNguyen, Gregoryen
dc.contributor.authorPraet, Peteren
dc.contributor.authorSapir, Andréen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-17-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-12T10:12:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-12T10:12:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45527-
dc.description.abstractThe financial crisis exposed Europe's inadequacy in developing an effective banking resolution framework that could bring together national authorities and set guidelines for their coordination. The European Commission, through its assessment of state aid cases, managed to avoid single market distortions and mitigate moral hazard. This Policy Contribution explains why in the long-term Europe needs a single resolution authority. The authors Bruegel Senior Research Fellow André Sapir, Mathias Dewatripont, ULB and CEPR; Gregory Nguyen, National Bank of Belgium, and Peter Praet, National Bank of Belgium, show how in the short-term, the European Commission, through its state aid control discipline, can set the foundation for a new crisis resolution architecture. It can act as a substitute to improve coordination among member states and complement a European resolution authority once it is set up.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBruegel |cBrusselsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBruegel Policy Contribution |x2010/04en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwBankenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten
dc.subject.stwBankenkriseen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleThe role of state aid control in improving bank resolution in Europe-
dc.typeResearch Reporten
dc.identifier.ppn629470995en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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