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dc.contributor.authorGoerke, Laszloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T09:39:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-09T09:39:08Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-56027en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45467-
dc.description.abstractIf tax obligations are met, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific tax not only raises a monopolist's production, but also represents a Pareto improvement. However, if tax avoidance or evasion is feasible and the marginal costs of such actions decline with the legal tax burden, a monopolist will respond to a balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax by reducing output, while profits remain constant. Therefore, in the presence of tax avoidance or evasion activities a move towards specific taxation can represent a Pareto improvement.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. Tübingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Tübingen working papers in economics and finance 8en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAd valorem taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordMonopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordOutputen_US
dc.subject.keywordTax avoidanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordSpecific taxen_US
dc.titleThe optimal structure of commodity taxation in a monopoly with tax avoidance or evasionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657436445en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuewef:8-
Appears in Collections:University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance

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