EconStor >
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Tübingen >
University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45467
  
Title:The optimal structure of commodity taxation in a monopoly with tax avoidance or evasion PDF Logo
Authors:Goerke, Laszlo
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:University of Tübingen working papers in economics and finance 8
Abstract:If tax obligations are met, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific tax not only raises a monopolist's production, but also represents a Pareto improvement. However, if tax avoidance or evasion is feasible and the marginal costs of such actions decline with the legal tax burden, a monopolist will respond to a balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax by reducing output, while profits remain constant. Therefore, in the presence of tax avoidance or evasion activities a move towards specific taxation can represent a Pareto improvement.
Subjects:Ad valorem tax
Monopoly
Output
Tax avoidance
Tax evasion
Specific tax
JEL:H21
H25
H26
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-56027
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
657436445.pdf181.34 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45467

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.