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dc.contributor.authorChen, Yingen_US
dc.contributor.authorEraslan, Hülyaen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the ideological positions are publicly known, it may not be possible to have informative communication from the legislator who is ideologically distant from the proposer, but the more moderate legislator can communicate whether he would 'compromise' or 'fight' on ideology. If instead the private information pertains to the ideological positions, then all parties may convey whether they will 'cooperate', 'compromise', or 'fight' on ideology. When the uncertainty is about ideological intensity, the proposer is always better on making proposals for the two dimensions together despite separable preferences, but when the uncertainty is about ideological positions, bundling can result in informational loss which hurts the proposer.en_US
dc.publisherTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Istanbulen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum working paper series 1021en_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleRhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, Koç University - TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum

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