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Title:Efficient dynamic matching with costly search PDF Logo
Authors:Atakan, Alp E.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum working paper series 1030
Abstract:This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria are characterized as the values that satisfy the first order conditions for a non-linear planner's (optimization) problem, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of efficient search equilibria under complete information. These results fully generalize to the twosided incomplete information setting, under an additive separability condition.
Two-sided Incomplete Information
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, Koç University - TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum

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