Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45347
Authors: 
Gu, Yiquan
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Ruhr economic papers 219
Abstract: 
Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is benefi cial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency implies lower profits and hence makes it less attractive to enter the market in the first place. It turns out that the second effect dominates: too much market transparency has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus and on social welfare.
Subjects: 
market transparency
endogenous entry
homogenous products
JEL: 
D43
L13
L15
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-251-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
238.65 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.