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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45044
  
Title:Enforcing peace agreements through commitment technologies PDF Logo
Authors:Murshed, S. Mansoob
Verwimp, Philip
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Research paper / UNU-WIDER 2008.45
Abstract:This paper models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may become incentive incompatible. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare may agree to peace, but will later renege on it. It is shown that the levels of conflict chosen by this group are an increasing function of both grievance and greed, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. Peace is achievable via externally devised mechanisms that enhance commitment to peace. Aid and direct military peacekeeping intervention (sanctions) can reduce or eliminate conflict. These sanctions, however, need to be credible. Finally, the independent provision and finance of international sanctions are considered. When these arrangements yield little benefit to financial sponsors, or are very costly to them, the bite of the sanctions can become ineffective.
Subjects:commitment problems
peace treaties
commitment technologies
sanctions
JEL:C78
D72
D74
D83
ISBN:978-92-9230-093-7
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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