Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44984 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 11-020
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analysed region, and disregard possible extra-regional effects. This paper evaluates the validity of such restriction by studying German local politicians' assessments of their jurisdictions' main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians' perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20km (12.5km) from a national (international) border. We also confirm that intranational borders are perceived as much less constraining for firms than international ones, even in a highly integrated area such as the European Union. Overall, these results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located. The practical implications of these findings for future studies on spatial policy interdependence are discussed.
Subjects: 
government interaction
competition
border effects
policy interdependence
JEL: 
D24
D60
H71
H72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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