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Title:A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter PDF Logo
Authors:Buechel, Berno
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Working paper series in economics 17
Abstract:We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative ('the median voter'). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof social choice rule on this domain.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:swb:90-225599
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)

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