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dc.contributor.authorKauppi, Heikkien_US
dc.contributor.authorWidgrén, Mikaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:31Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44591-
dc.description.abstractThe member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos Helsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesETLA discussion paper 1161en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean integrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordEU budgeten_US
dc.subject.keywordvoting poweren_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Finanzenen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten_US
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleDo benevolent aspects have room explaining EU budget receipts?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn585257884en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:ETLA Discussion Papers, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)

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