Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44591
Authors: 
Kauppi, Heikki
Widgrén, Mika
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ETLA discussion paper 1161
Abstract: 
The member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model.
Subjects: 
European integration
EU budget
voting power
JEL: 
C71
D70
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
277.22 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.