Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527
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dc.contributor.authorKauhanen, Anttien_US
dc.contributor.authorNapari, Samien_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:38:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:38:42Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aElinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aETLA discussion paper |x1216en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentive payen_US
dc.subject.keywordperformance measurementen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk versus distortion trade-offen_US
dc.subject.keywordagency theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwPerformance-Messungen_US
dc.subject.stwAngestellteen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.titlePerformance measurement and incentive plansen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn62731502Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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