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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kauhanen, Antti | en |
dc.contributor.author | Napari, Sami | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-25T09:38:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-03-25T09:38:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) |cHelsinki | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aETLA Discussion Papers |x1216 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M54 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Incentive pay | en |
dc.subject.keyword | performance measurement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | risk versus distortion trade-off | en |
dc.subject.keyword | agency theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Performance-Messung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Angestellte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | en |
dc.title | Performance measurement and incentive plans | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 62731502X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:rif:dpaper:1216 | en |
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